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It’s Iran’s turn to have its digital surveillance tools leaked : According to these internal documents, SIAM is a computer system that works behind the scenes of Iranian cellular networks, providing its operators a broad menu of remote commands to alter, disrupt, and monitor how customers use their phones.
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that breaking end-to-end encryption by adding backdoors violates human rights : Seemingly most critically, the [Russian] government told the ECHR that any intrusion on private lives resulting from decrypting messages was “necessary” to combat terrorism in a democratic society.
The Bill provides no explicit protection for encryption, and if implemented as written, could empower OFCOM to try to force the proactive scanning of private messages on end-to-end encrypted communication services – nullifying the purpose of end-to-end encryption as a result and compromising the privacy of all users.
Remember when the US and Australian police surreptitiously owned and operated the encrypted cell phone app ANOM? Allegations that the FBI outsourced warrantless surveillance of Americans to a foreign government raise troubling questions about the Justice Department’s oversight of these practices.”
Yesterday, Attorney General William Barr gave a major speech on encryption policy -- what is commonly known as "going dark." Nor are we necessarily talking about the customized encryption used by large business enterprises to protect their operations. I think this is a major change in government position.
Some of us -- myself included -- have proposed lawful government hacking as an alternative to backdoors. A new report from the Center of Internet and Society looks at the security risks of allowing government hacking. From the report's conclusion: Government hacking is often lauded as a solution to the "going dark" problem.
Last month, Attorney General William Barr gave a major speech on encryption policywhat is commonly known as "going dark." Nor are we necessarily talking about the customized encryption used by large business enterprises to protect their operations. I think this is a major change in government position.
Cybersecurity governance has undergone a dramatic transformation over the past few decades. From its early days, where security was an afterthought to business operations, to the present, where it has become a board-level discussion, governance has had to adapt to an ever-evolving digital landscape.
Key Findings: MY2022, an app mandated for use by all attendees of the 2022 Olympic Games in Beijing, has a simple but devastating flaw where encryption protecting users’ voice audio and file transfers can be trivially sidestepped. Citizen Lab examined the app and found it riddled with security holes.
Should law enforcement and military officials have access to a digital backdoor enabling them to bypass any and all types of encryption that exist today? The disturbing thing is that in North America and Europe more and more arguments are being raised in support of creating and maintaining encryption backdoors for government use.
Researchers warn of previously undetected surveillance spyware, named NoviSpy, that was found infecting a Serbian journalist’s phone. Then he requested help from Amnesty Internationals Security Lab fearing to be the target of surveillance software like other journalists in Serbia. ” reads the report published by Amnesty.
Both bills have provisions that could be used to break end-to-end encryption. 3(c)(7)(A)(iii) would allow a company to deny access to apps installed by users, where those app makers “have been identified [by the Federal Government] as national security, intelligence, or law enforcement risks.” Let’s start with S.
Susan Landau published an excellent essay on the current justification for the government breaking end-to-end-encryption: child sexual abuse and exploitation (CSAE). She puts the debate into historical context, discusses the problem of CSAE, and explains why breaking encryption isn’t the solution.
The company exclusively sells exploits to the Russian government and local firms. Russian intelligence agencies could use these exploits for surveillance and espionage purposes. Given Telegrams end-to-end encryption and widespread use, an exploit that bypasses its security could be a game-changer for cyber espionage.
Today, October 21, marks the first ever organized Global Encryption Day, dedicated to spreading awareness of the importance of utilizing encryption to protect sensitive information, both when it is in transit (e.g., online chat messages going over the Internet between you and your significant other) and when it is at rest (e.g.,
Bart Gellman's long-awaited (at least by me) book on Edward Snowden, Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State , will finally be published in a couple of weeks. It's an interesting read, mostly about the governmentsurveillance of him and other journalists. There is an adapted excerpt in the Atlantic.
The US NCSC and the Department of State published joint guidance on defending against attacks using commercial surveillance tools. In the last years, we have reported several cases of companies selling commercial surveillance tools to governments and other entities that have used them for malicious purposes. Pierluigi Paganini.
Government, in turn, must provide more timely and comprehensive threat information while simultaneously treating industry as a vital partner. Or the surveillance capitalists, for that matter. I’m not sure how he’s going to get them on board. A lot of what he wants will require reining in that particular business model.
In a groundbreaking investigative report, the European Investigative Collaborations (EIC) media network, with technical assistance from Amnesty International's Security Lab, has exposed the shocking extent of the global surveillance crisis and the glaring inadequacies of EU regulation in curbing it. Chairman, Cedric Leighton Associates, LLC.
Each of these images fails to convey anything about either the importance or the complexity of the topic -- or the huge stakes for governments, industry and ordinary people alike inherent in topics like encryption, surveillance and cyber conflict. I agree that this is a problem. It's not something I noticed until recently.
Australia, and elsewhere -- argue that the pervasive use of civilian encryption is hampering their ability to solve crimes and that they need the tech companies to make their systems susceptible to government eavesdropping. It doesn't affect the encryption that protects the communications. Sometimes it's about end-user devices.
The government agencies released a guide that advises telecom and critical infrastructure defenders on best practices to strengthen network security against PRC-linked and other cyber threats. Strong segmentation with firewalls and DMZs, securing VPN gateways, and ensuring encrypted traffic with TLS v1.3 ” continues the advisory.
The vulnerability, discovered earlier this month, allowed third parties to see and intercept encrypted communications. The spyware deployed has been traced back to NSO Group, an Israeli cyber company alleged to have enabled Middle East governments to surveil its citizens.
The popular privacy-focused email service ProtonMail has been accused of offering voluntarily real-time surveillance assistance to law enforcement. The popular privacy-focused email service ProtonMail made the headlines because it has been accused of supporting real-time surveillance carried out by law enforcement.
North Korea-linked threat actor ScarCruft (aka APT37 , Reaper, and Group123) is behind a previously undetected Android surveillance tool namedKoSpythat was used to target Korean and English-speaking users. Cyber attacks conducted by the APT37 group mainly targeted government, defense, military,and media organizations in South Korea.
The five core components of a VPN are: Encryption : The conversion of information into a coded format that can only be read by someone who has the decryption key. Split tunneling: Allows you to choose which internet traffic goes through the VPN (with encryption) and which goes directly to the internet. How do VPNs work?
in 2018 beat back federal prosecutors seeking to wiretap its encrypted Messenger app. If the decision is unsealed, other tech companies will likely try to use its reasoning to ward off similar government requests in the future. This is interesting : Facebook Inc. Now the American Civil Liberties Union is seeking to find out how.
ScarCruft is known to target North Korean defectors, journalists who cover North Korea-related news and government organizations related to the Korean Peninsula, between others. The script compares the given encrypted string with a second string to get an index of matched characters. These log files contain the uploading history.
In fact, WhatsApp would rather cease serving UK users, which make up 2% of its global market, than weaken its end-to-end encryption (E2EE). At the moment, organizations cannot scan end-to-end encrypted messages. This also precedes state-mandated surveillance on a mass scale, with privacy and security risks affecting entire societies.
Because the companies that make the equipment are subservient to the Chinese government, they could be forced to include backdoors in the hardware or software to give Beijing remote access. Both criminal attacks and government cyber-operations will become more common and more damaging. But the enhancements aren't enough.
Nexa Technologies was indicted for complicity in acts of torture, the French firm is accused of having sold surveillance equipment to the Egypt. Nexa Technologies offers a range of solutions for homeland security, including surveillance solutions. “In short, Cerebro can suck up any data that is not encrypted.
And if you read his 3,000-word post carefully, Zuckerberg says nothing about changing Facebook's surveillance capitalism business model. On the other hand, WhatsApp -- purchased by Facebook in 2014 -- provides users with end-to-end encrypted messaging. Better data security so Facebook sees less. How Facebook manages for privacy.
In August, Gunnebo said it had successfully thwarted a ransomware attack, but this week it emerged that the intruders stole and published online tens of thousands of sensitive documents — including schematics of client bank vaults and surveillance systems. He declined to comment on the particulars of the extortion incident.
The p opular ProtonMail end-to-end encrypted email service and ProtonVPN VPN service have been blocked by the Russian government this week. This week the Russian government has blocked the ProtonMail end-to-end encrypted email service and ProtonVPN VPN service. Pierluigi Paganini.
The Sweden government is going to authorize the use of spyware on suspects’ devices to spy on their communications and track them. “ The police are given the opportunity to read encrypted communications. From March next year, it will be legal to intercept encrypted calls in mobiles, computers and video calls.”
Sometime around 1993 or 1994, during the first Crypto Wars, I was part of a group of cryptography experts that went to Washington to advocate for strong encryption. Back then, he and Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy were the most knowledgeable on this issue and our biggest supporters against government backdoors. They still are.
Experts from Amnesty International uncovered a surveillance campaign that targeted Egyptian civil society organizations with a new version of FinSpy spyware. The mobile version of the surveillance software in the first stage of the infection leverages the exploits to get root access. ” reads the Amnesty’s report.
On one side is law enforcement, which wants to be able to break encryption, to access devices and communications of terrorists and criminals. Pervasive surveillance capitalism -- as practiced by the Internet companies that are already spying on everyone -- matters. The Crypto Wars have been waging off-and-on for a quarter-century.
Privacy and security advocates may be forced to battle it out on the Senate floor to stop a newly introduced bill that will help law enforcement get past encryption. New backdoor bill in Congress hits encryption debate head on. The question: should encrypted communication be out of law enforcement's reach?
How is the UK Government trying to influence the public's opinion on end-to-end encryption? How does Microsoft hope to defeat the macro terror? And what is MoviePass hoping to do with your eyeballs?
CheckPoint uncovered an extensive surveillance operation conducted by Iranian APT actor and tracked as Domestic Kitten aimed at specific groups of individuals. ” This means that the Domestic Kitten surveillance operation had collateral victims whose details were leaked from contact lists or conversations with the targets.
WhatsApp sued Israeli surveillance firm NSO Group, accusing it of using a flaw in its messaging service to conduct cyberespionage on journalists and activists. WhatsApp sued the Israeli surveillance firm NSO Group accusing it of carrying out malicious attacks against its users. This abuse must be stopped. ” reads the lawsuit.
Russia-linked APT29 group was spotted reusing iOS and Chrome exploits previously developed by surveillance firms NSO Group and Intellexa. using exploits previously used by surveillance software vendors NSO Group and Intellexa. APT29 used obfuscated JavaScript to inject a malicious iframe and employed ECDH key exchange for encryption.
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