This site uses cookies to improve your experience. To help us insure we adhere to various privacy regulations, please select your country/region of residence. If you do not select a country, we will assume you are from the United States. Select your Cookie Settings or view our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
Cookie Settings
Cookies and similar technologies are used on this website for proper function of the website, for tracking performance analytics and for marketing purposes. We and some of our third-party providers may use cookie data for various purposes. Please review the cookie settings below and choose your preference.
Used for the proper function of the website
Used for monitoring website traffic and interactions
Cookie Settings
Cookies and similar technologies are used on this website for proper function of the website, for tracking performance analytics and for marketing purposes. We and some of our third-party providers may use cookie data for various purposes. Please review the cookie settings below and choose your preference.
Strictly Necessary: Used for the proper function of the website
Performance/Analytics: Used for monitoring website traffic and interactions
I just released some technical details on why and how "seccomp" is vulnerable to the Linux kernel syscall filtering problems that I previously blogged about. The full details may be found here: [link] The actual bug is of little significance because pretty much no-one uses seccomp: This searches for the PR_SET_SECCOMP string on Google Code Search In addition, even if people did use this -- the bug is not a full break out, just some leakage of filesystem names via stat() or mischief via unrestric
I recently came up with a little API abuse of the clone() system call. Not earth shattering, but definitely fun. Essentially, you can send any signal you want at any time to your parent process, even if it is running with real and effective user id of someone else (e.g. root ). Full technical details and an example may be found here: [link] Maybe someone more devious that me can come up with better abuse scenarios than I can.
The new sandboxing support mentioned in the vsftpd-2.1.0 announcement post is actually a ptrace() based sandbox. It is experimental and therefore off by default. It only currently supports i386 Linux (but there's no reason you couldn't hack the Makefile to build 32-bit on 64-bit Linux). When enabled, it only engages when using one_process_model , i.e. simple anonymous-only configurations.
I just released vsftpd-2.1.0, with full details being available on the vsftpd web page: [link] It fixes a bunch of bugs and compile errors, introduces a few minor new features, has some code clean ups, etc. etc. vsftpd-2.1.0 is interesting from a security perspective because of its changes to SSL support. It actual contains a reasonable resolution to the connection theft attack I blogged about here: [link] In the linked advisory I said "I have a crazy idea to use the SSL session cache as a cheez
Many cybersecurity awareness platforms offer massive content libraries, yet they fail to enhance employees’ cyber resilience. Without structured, engaging, and personalized training, employees struggle to retain and apply key cybersecurity principles. Phished.io explains why organizations should focus on interactive, scenario-based learning rather than overwhelming employees with excessive content.
We organize all of the trending information in your field so you don't have to. Join 28,000+ users and stay up to date on the latest articles your peers are reading.
You know about us, now we want to get to know you!
Let's personalize your content
Let's get even more personalized
We recognize your account from another site in our network, please click 'Send Email' below to continue with verifying your account and setting a password.
Let's personalize your content