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It's time to write some coherent details about "cookie forcing", which is the name I've given for a new way to attempt to break into secure https sessions. This is surfjacking to the max - attacks an active MITM (man-in-the-middle) can attempt against an https application that follows best practices like marking its cookies secure; avoiding XSS and XSRF; etc.
When I talk to a lot of security researchers or paranoid types, it's very common to hear them describe how they very carefully access their bank account or personal GMail etc. Generally, the model used is to launch a separate browser instance, and navigate straight to an https bookmark. The session remains single-window, single-tab. It's a powerful model; the intent is to eliminate the chance of another (http) tab being a vector for owning the browser, or more likely abusing a cross-domain flaw
Up-front credit to my colleagues Filipe Almeida and Michal Zalewski who led the way in E4X security research. If you haven't heard of E4X, or don't know why Firefox's E4X support should scare you, please consider reading this article. I've just released details for a recently fixed Firefox XML injection bug. It's one of those bugs that is in search of a good exploitation opportunity.
Here's the first bug with full details from my PacSec presentation. It's fixed in the recent Firefox 2.0.0.18 update. Firefox 3 was never vulnerable. In a nutshell, decent modern browsers permit you to read the pixels from an image by rendering images to a and calling the Javascript APIs getImageData or toDataUrl. Therefore, cross-domain checks are required on the usage of these APIs.
Many cybersecurity awareness platforms offer massive content libraries, yet they fail to enhance employees’ cyber resilience. Without structured, engaging, and personalized training, employees struggle to retain and apply key cybersecurity principles. Phished.io explains why organizations should focus on interactive, scenario-based learning rather than overwhelming employees with excessive content.
My recent PacSec presentation (with Billy Rios), entitled "Cross-domain leakiness", is now online. You can view it via this link. There's a new way to attack SSL-enabled web apps in there ("Cookie Forcing"); a bunch of serious browser cross-domain thefts (many not yet disclosed); and attacks against the paranoid one window / one tab browsing model. The slides by themselves are a little sketchy on detail.
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