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US CFPB warns employees to avoid work-related mobile calls and texts following China-linked Salt Typhoon hack over security concerns. Do NOT conduct CFPB work using mobile voice calls or text messages,” reads the email sent to the employees referencing a recent government statement acknowledging the telecommunications infrastructure attack.
The Iranian Lycaeum APT hacking group uses a new.NET-based DNS backdoor to conduct attacks on companies in the energy and telecommunication sectors. [.].
Iran-linked Lyceum APT group uses a new.NET-based DNS backdoor to target organizations in the energy and telecommunication sectors. The Iran-linked Lyceum APT group, aka Hexane or Spilrin, used a new.NET-based DNS backdoor in a campaign aimed at companies in the energy and telecommunication sectors, ZScaler researchers warn.
Security expert uncovered a DNS hijacking campaign targeting organizations in various industries worldwide and suspects Iranian APT groups. It is interesting to note that FireEye confirmed that this campaign is different from other operations carried out by Iranian APT groups due to the use of DNS hijacking at scale.
DHS has issued a notice of a CISA emergency directive urging federal agencies of improving the security of government-managed domains (i.e.gov) to prevent DNS hijacking attacks. The notice was issued by the DHS and links the emergency directive Emergency Directive 19-01 titled “Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering.”.
On September 2022, the Sandworm group was observed impersonating telecommunication providers to target Ukrainian entities with malware. Since late 2021, the subgroup has targeted networks by modifying Outlook Web Access (OWA) sign-in pages and DNS configurations.
China-linked cyberespionage group LightBasin hacked mobile telephone networks around the world and used specialized tools to access calling records. CrowdStrike researchers reported that at least 13 telecommunication companies were compromised by since 2019. ” reads the report published by Crowdstrike.
“The hacking campaign, called Salt Typhoon by investigators, hasn’t previously been publicly disclosed and is the latest in a series of incursions that U.S. and its allies for hacking activities in July. Upon investigating the incidents, the researchers determined that a DNS poisoning attack at the ISP level caused the infection.
CrowdStrike security researchers have discovered that a hacking group dubbed LightBasin aka UNC1945 has been hiding in the networks of renowned telecom networks from the past 5 years, monitoring all their business operations and sending censorious data to remote servers.
The malicious code can also perform DNS and HTTP hijacking within private IP spaces. “What makes this malware family so insidious is the ability to perform HTTP and DNS hijacking for connections to private IP addresses. Additionally, it can interact with other devices on the LAN and transfer data or deploy new agents.
Earth Baxia primarily targeted government agencies, telecommunication businesses, and the energy industry in the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand. The EAGLEDOOR backdoor can communicate with C2 via DNS, HTTP, TCP, and Telegram.
“The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ( ICANN ) believes that there is an ongoing and significant risk to key parts of the Domain Name System ( DNS ) infrastructure. The notice was issued by the DHS and links the emergency directive Emergency Directive 19-01 titled “Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering.”.
Russia-linked APT group Sandworm has been observed impersonating telecommunication providers to target Ukrainian entities with malware. Russia-linked cyberespionage group Sandworm has been observed impersonating telecommunication providers to target Ukrainian entities with malware. SecurityAffairs – hacking, Log4Shell).
The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) warns of GALLIUM threat group targeting global telecommunication providers worldwide. The Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) warns of GALLIUM threat group targeting global telecommunication providers worldwide. SecurityAffairs – GALLIUM, hacking). Pierluigi Paganini.
Over the past year, ExCobalt targeted Russian organizations in the the following industries: Metallurgy Telecommunications Mining Information technology Government Software development The Cobalt’s hallmark was the use of the CobInt tool , the same tool that ExCobalt began using in 2022. ” concludes the report.
The campaign uncovered by Avast aimed at silently modifying the Brazilian users’ Domain Name System (DNS) settings to redirect victims to malicious websites mimicking legitimate ones. In some cases the router is reconfigured to use rogue DNS servers, which redirect victims to phishing pages that closely look like real online banking sites.
Security expert Marco Ramilli published the findings of a quick analysis of the webmask project standing behind the DNS attacks implemented by APT34 (aka OilRig and HelixKitten ). The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries.
Between 2017 and 2019, the APT group mainly used DNS hijacking in its campaigns. The group targets government entities, Kurdish (political) groups like PKK, telecommunication, ISPs, IT-service providers (including security companies), NGO, and Media & Entertainment sectors; Over the years, the group enhanced its evasion capabilities.
In March 2020, The Ministry of Telecommunications (MoTC) issued a directive to all operators in Myanmar with a secret list of 230 sites to be blocked due to the nature of the content; adult content and fake news. Our findings show that both Telenor and MPT block websites using DNS tampering. SecurityAffairs – hacking, Myanmar).
reported that Hexane is targeting organizations in the oil and gas industry and telecommunication providers. The malware uses DNS and HTTP-based communication mechanisms. Experts pointed out that Lyceum does not use sophisticated hacking techniques. SecurityAffairs – Lyceum, hacking). Security experts at Dragos Inc.
Indeed we might observe a File-based command and control (a quite unusual solution) structure, a VBS launcher, a PowerShell Payload and a covert channel over DNS engine. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries.
One of the trends related to the active confrontation between attackers has been hacking back, i.e. when attackers become the victims of hacking. The past months have shown that the most dangerous hacks involved DNS hijacking, which helped attackers manipulate DNS records for MITM attacks. Pierluigi Paganini.
The APT hacking group is believed to have been behind numerous attacks this year, including an attack on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and the deployment of a persistent botnet called “ Cyclops Blink ” dismantled by the US government in April. SecurityAffairs – hacking, Prestige ransomware). Pierluigi Paganini.
MuddyWater (also known as TEMP.Zagros, Static Kitten, Seedworm, and Mercury) is a threat group that primarily targets telecommunications, government, oil, defense, and finance sectors in the Middle East, Europe, and North America. By utilizing the Google Update service, goopdate.dll conceals communications with C2 servers.
The C2 infrastructure used by the group was primarily hosted on the Bulgarian telecommunications company Neterra. Experts observed threat actors also using No-IP Dynamic DNS services. SecurityAffairs – hacking, NoName057(16) ). GitHub removed the accounts after SentinelOne reported the abuse to the company. Pierluigi Paganini.
According to the DNS data analysis, this name was used to register at least two domains, which were created using the email from the phishing kit. SecurityAffairs – hacking, Operation Lyrebird). ” said Dmitry Volkov Group-IB CTO and Head of Threat Hunting Intelligence. Original post at [link]. Pierluigi Paganini.
The group has targeted a variety of industries, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications, and has largely focused its operations within the Middle East. T1094) mainly developed using DNS resolutions (which is actually one of the main characteristic of the attacker group).
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) offers the concept of a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to address this problem. For CrowdStrike , months after the attempted hack, they were first alerted about attempts to read email and abnormal communication between their MS Office licenses and MS cloud APIs.
31, 2019, Rezvesz said his company recently was the subject of an international search warrant executed jointly by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). “In In an “official press release” posted to pastebin.com on Mar.
If so we are facing a state-sponsored group with high capabilities in developing persistence and hidden communication channels (for example over DNS) but without a deep interest in exploiting services. The group’s victims are mainly in the telecommunications, government (IT services), and oil sectors.” Pierluigi Paganini.
Advances in the use of polymers revolutionized everything from food packaging to electronics, telecommunication and medicine. One of the unique things about how they did this is they judged it in a full spectrum hacking contest. If you look at like the Tesla hack, it was interesting. but they never actually checked that.
Advances in the use of polymers revolutionized everything from food packaging to electronics, telecommunication and medicine. One of the unique things about how they did this is they judged it in a full spectrum hacking contest. If you look at like the Tesla hack, it was interesting. but they never actually checked that.
Advances in the use of polymers revolutionized everything from food packaging to electronics, telecommunication and medicine. One of the unique things about how they did this is they judged it in a full spectrum hacking contest. If you look at like the Tesla hack, it was interesting. but they never actually checked that.
It was first publicly documented in 2014, in the aftermath of the Gamma Group hacking incident. Although Lyceum still prefers taking advantage of DNS tunneling, it appears to have replaced the previously documented.NET payload with a new C++ backdoor and a PowerShell script that serve the same purpose.
The DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) protocol is used to establish secure connections over UDP, through which most DNS queries, as well as audio and video traffic, are sent. In October, telecommunications firm Telenor Norway was another to fall victim. Extortionists’ activity regularly made the news throughout 2020.
According to CRN news , SolarWinds stated that its customers included 425 of the US Fortune 500, the top ten US telecommunications companies, the top five US accounting firms, all branches of the US Military, the Pentagon, the State Department, as well as hundreds of universities and colleges worldwide. Infected Domains Analysis.
However, passive domain name system (DNS) records from DomainTools show that between October 2023 and March 2024 radaris.com was hosted alongside all of the other Gary Norden domains at the Internet address range 38.111.228.x. A spreadsheet of those historical DNS entries for radaris.com is available here (.csv).
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