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Ross Anderson

Schneier on Security

I know I was at the Fast Software Encryption workshop in December 1993, another conference he created. There I presented the Blowfish encryption algorithm. His masterwork book, Security Engineering —now in its Third Edition—is as comprehensive a tome on cybersecurity and related topics as you could imagine.

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Bart Gellman on Snowden

Schneier on Security

Bart Gellman's long-awaited (at least by me) book on Edward Snowden, Dark Mirror: Edward Snowden and the American Surveillance State , will finally be published in a couple of weeks. It's an interesting read, mostly about the government surveillance of him and other journalists. I'm looking forward to reading Gellman's book.

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Snowden Ten Years Later

Schneier on Security

In 2013 and 2014, I wrote extensively about new revelations regarding NSA surveillance based on the documents provided by Edward Snowden. Chatting with Snowden on an encrypted IM connection, I joked that the NSA cafeteria menu probably has code names for menu items. Transferring files electronically is what encryption is for.

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The Evolution of Encrypted IM Messenging Platforms – The Rise and Future of the OMEMO Protocol – An Analysis

Security Boulevard

Compared to OTR (Off-the-Record) which basically allows single-user type of secure and encrypted communication the OMEMO protocol actually allows multi-user type of data and information exchange further strengthening the protocol's position on the market for secure mobile IM (instant messaging) applications. Stay tuned!

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Policy vs Technology

Schneier on Security

Sometime around 1993 or 1994, during the first Crypto Wars, I was part of a group of cryptography experts that went to Washington to advocate for strong encryption. Markey was against forcing encrypted phone providers to implement the NSA's Clipper Chip in their devices, but wanted us to reach a compromise with the FBI regardless.

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Attacking Machine Learning Systems

Schneier on Security

But aside from some special cases and unique circumstances, that’s not how encryption systems are exploited in practice. I wrote this in my book, Data and Goliath : The problem is that encryption is just a bunch of math, and math has no agency. This is bulk surveillance and can easily operate on this massive scale.

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Here’s what data the FBI can get from WhatsApp, iMessage, Signal, Telegram, and more

Malwarebytes

A recently disclosed FBI training document shows how much access to the content of encrypted messages from secure messaging services US law enforcement can gain and what they can learn about your usage of the apps. All of them are messaging apps that promise end-to-end encryption for their users.